Analytical reading of a book The October Victory in Israeli Documents Political leadership documents - Part One

Analytical reading of a book
The October Victory in Israeli Documents
Political leadership documents - Part One

Alexandria on November 10, 2023

Researcher Dr. Ghada Mahmoud Abdel Hamid
Fellow of the National Defense College - Military Academy for Postgraduate and Strategic Studies.
Doctorate in Sociology of Media and Communication - Faculty of Arts - Alexandria University.
The Egyptian Arabic Republic.

introduction :
The book "The October Victory in Israeli Documents: Documents of the Political Leadership - Part One" is an important source for understanding the 1973 October War from an Israeli perspective.where The book presented a collection of official documents and other sources documenting the decisions and positions of the Israeli political leadership during that critical period.Therefore, there are some points that must be taken into consideration when reading the book, which we present as follows:
The book should be placed in the context of the previous Arab-Israeli war and the political and military events that took place in the region before the October War where Understanding past events can help explain the context that led to the war and its impact on the decisions of Israel s political leadership.
From inspiration that The sources and documents used in the book were reviewed.And These include official documents such as intelligence reports, diplomatic correspondence, and military records And that To ensure that facts and events are documented.
The book explains its objectives and analysis methodology .By asking some questions, including :What questions does the book try to answer? What are the main points it focuses on? Focal topics can include analysis of political decisions and military tactics and evaluation of the outcomes and strategic impacts of war. asThe possible influence of ideological orientation on the book s analysis must be properly considered and appreciated.
Overall, the book presentsDocuments and sources documenting the political decisions taken by the Israeli leadership during the October War, and presenting details about the strategies followed and the tactics used in the field..asThe book examines the impact of political decisions on the course of the war and its outcomes, and provides an assessment of Israel s military and political performance during that period, In addition to an offerDiplomatic and strategic factors that ultimately contributed to the
ceasefire and progress in the negotiations.
Getting to know the book
“The October Victory in Israeli Documents”



Dr. Al-Bahrawi led a group of professors and doctors specializing in the Hebrew language in translating more than 7,000 Israeli documents that reveal the dimensions of the Egyptian victory on October 6, 1973, and the depths of the Israeli defeat, raising many questions as to why the Israeli authorities were determined to withhold the most important documents for more than forty years. Why did you deliberately -delete-some words, lines and paragraphs from the documents that were published? We are faced with material worthy of in-depth research. These documents were issued in several parts under the title “The October Victory in Israeli Documents” and were issued by the National Center for Translation, where the number of published documents reached 240 documents containing 5,200 pages of documents. It is divided into three groups: minutes of meetings of the War Council, minutes of testimonies of officials before the Agranat Committee, and various documents related to the army.
Under the supervision of the head of the translation team, Dr. Ashraf El-Sharkawy, a full-time professor at the Faculty of Arts, Mansoura University, and an expert on Israeli affairs, the translation team included 14 specialists in the Hebrew language, as this project was considered the first of its kind to translate the complete Israeli documents for the October War. So far - October 2023 - about 4,500 pages of documents have been translated, issued in seven parts, each part containing several books, and about 2,500 documents remain that have not yet been translated. Four of the seven translated parts have been published, and three unpublished parts remain, the publication of which is being delayed due to the death of four of the team. Work, others emigrated, and others apologized for continuing to participate in the work.
Documentation of the book

The Address: October Victory In Israeli Documents Documents Of The Political Leadership - Part One
Publishing: Cairo: National Center For Translation, 2014.
Edition: The First.
Physical De----script----ion: 727 Pages.
Size:17 X 24 Cm, Large Cut.
Series : National Translation Project, No. 2669.
Book Type : Military Politician.
Topics: Israel - Military Policy - Golda Meir - Military Administration - Historical Documents - Yigal Allon - Investigation Committees - Israel - Documents - Israel Arab-Israeli War 1973 - October War - Agranat Committee - Israel Lior - Abba Eban - Israel Galilei - Haim Tsadok - Moshe Kol.
Author:Ibrahim Al-Bahrawi, [supervisor] Mona Nazim, [translator] Saeed Al-Akash, [translator] Saeed Al-Akash, [translator] Mansour Abdel-Wahab, [translator] Ashraf Al-Sharqawi, [translator] Badawi Muhammad, [translator] Mustafa Al-Hawari, [translator] Adel Mustafa , [Translator] Saad Singer, [Translator] Hussein Abdel Badie, [Translator] Abdullah Hamdi, [Translator] Muhammad Al-Masry, [Proofreader] Hassan Kamel, [Supervisor].


Introducing the primary translator and reviewer: Dr. Ibrahim Al-Bahrawy
Born in Port Said Governorate on October 12, 1944, he is a full-time professor at the Faculty of Arts, Department of Hebrew Studies, Ain Shams University, and Vice Chairman of the Board of ----dir----ectors of the Center for Israeli Studies, Zagazig University. Al-Bahrawi obtained a doctorate in contemporary Israeli war literature, Ain Shams University, 1972, first class honors. And a Master’s degree in Jewish religious thought, Ain Shams University, 1969, first class honors, where he received the State Award of Appreciation in Arts, from the Supreme Council of Culture in 2009, and the State Award for Excellence in Social Sciences, from the Supreme Council of Culture in 1999..
Dr. Ibrahim Al-Bahrawi is considered one of the most famous professors of Israeli studies. He investigated Israeli prisoners in the period between 1967 and 1973, and issued a study on the attitudes and feelings of Israeli prisoners of war through interviews in the Egyptian military prison in the 1967 war and the 1973 war. He also issued a study on currents of religious thought. And the conflicting secularisms in Israeli society through contemporary Hebrew literature
Among his most prominent works are the following:
-Spotlight on Zionist Literature 1972.
-Hebrew literature between the wars of 1967-1973.
- The October War: long-term effects and interactions in Zionist thought, 1979.
-The image of the Palestinian Arab in Zionist thought, 1980.
-Religion and the world in Israel, 1998.
- Arabs and Jews between conflict and settlement, 1999.
-Israeli determinants of the future of the peace settlement process under the Sharon government, Arab Center for Strategic Studies, Cairo, April 2001.
- Member of the scientific team to study the concepts and attitudes of Israeli prisoners of war, the National Center for Social Research 1973..
-Supervisor of the page “How Israel Thinks”, the Egyptian newspaper “Al-Akhbar” 1979-1985.
-Editor of Israeli Affairs, Al-Ittihad newspaper, UAE 1985-1999.
-Weekly article writer, Al-Hayat newspaper, London, 1995 -,. Rosal Youssef Magazine 1996-1998.
He contributed by writing articles for the Opinion and National Dialogue pages, Al-Ahram newspaper 1995-2001.
He also participated and lectured in many specialized scientific seminars at the Middle East Research Center, the Nasser Higher Military Academy, the Center for Strategic Studies in Al-Ahram, the Arab Center for Strategic Studies in Cairo, the League of Arab States, and the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He passed away on January 5, 2020 AD.
Introduction to the book
Dr. wrote. Ibrahim Al-Bahrawi, in the introduction to the book, talks about the extent of the difficulty he faced in obtaining the texts of the documents, which were published by the Israeli Army Archives in Hebrew, after withholding them for forty years, and through them the Israeli occupation army was keen to -delete-many passages from these documents, ranging from one´-or-several words.´-or-a paragraph, a page,´-or-several pages, which is significant, as there are matters that the Israeli leadership wants to hide, perhaps for a reason related to the morale of the Israelis and national security secrets. This is due to the national and historical rights that these documents represent for new generations, as the Israelis withheld these documents for a period of time. For forty years to hide the facts of the Egyptian victory and protect their morale from collapsing, and they were not satisfied with that. Rather, when the Israeli Army Archive published the documents on its website, it at the same time created technical obstacles that prevented them from being easily accessed by Egyptian researchers in particular, and a team of website experts was able to overcome over these obstacles. The book includes testimonies of the most prominent political and military leaders, including the testimony of Golda Meir, Prime Minister, and Moshe Dayan, Minister of Defense, Secretary to the Prime Minister for Military Affairs, and Deputy Prime Minister. Abba Eban, Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as Yisrael Galili, Minister of State for Information, Chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, Minister of Tourism, and other prominent commanders of weapons, staff, and main fronts, who gave vivid testimonies confirming the superiority of the Egyptian fighter.
Dedication
To the Egyptian fighter of all times

The book includes nine chapters, the titles of which are presented as follows:
Chapter One :Study of documents: necessities, contents, connotations and lessons learned
Chapter II :It included consultation sessions in the Prime Minister’s Office (to manage the war) from October 6 at 8:5 a.m. to October 9 at 9:50 a.m. Record of the meetings: Elie Mizrahi, ----dir----ector of the Prime Minister’s Office at the time, included several highly secret sessions, namely:
(1) Top Secret Consultations in the Prime Minister’s Office, Tel Aviv, Yom Kippur, October 6, 1973 at 8:05 a.m.
(2) Top secret consultation session in the Prime Minister’s Office on October 7, 1973 at 9:10 a.m.
(3) Top secret consultation session in the Prime Minister’s Office on October 7, 1973 at 1:40 p.m.)
(4) Top secret consultation session in the Prime Minister’s Office on October 7, 1973 at 2.50 p.m.
(5) Top secret consultation session in the Prime Minister’s Office on October 7, 1973 at 23:50.
(6) A top-secret consultation session in the Prime Minister’s Office with the participation of the Chief of Staff on October 8, 1973 at 9:50.
(7) Top secret consultation session in the Prime Minister’s Office with the participation of the Prime Minister on October 8, 1973 at 19:50, a report by Lieutenant General Barlev and Minister Alon after a tour of the fronts.
(8) Top secret consultation session in the Prime Minister’s Office on October 9, 1973 at 7:30 a.m.
Chapter III
Testimony of Golda Meir, Prime Minister (before the committee investigating the defeat - the Agranat Committee) on February 6, 1974 AD. The chapter included two sessions:
(1) Golda Meir’s testimony before the Procedure Committee, February 6, 1974
(2) Golda Meir’s testimony before the Procedure Committee, February 6, 1974, Session No. 81 in the afternoon.
the fourth chapter :
Testimony of Brigadier General Yisrael Lenor, Secretary to the Prime Minister for Military Affairs, December 6, 1973. The document was released in 2012. The session began at 9:40.
Chapter V: Include details of the testimony of Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister
Chapter six: Include the testimony of Abba Abian, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Chapter VII :It includes the testimony of Israel Galili, Minister of State for Information
Chapter Eight :Testimony of Haim Tsadok, Chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee
Chapter Nine :Testimony of Moshe Kohl, Minister of Tourism.
The researcher will discuss in detail what was stated in the first chapter of this book due to its importance in the documents of the political leaders during the October 1973 war, and the rest of the book chapter, which included a detailed presentation translated from Arabic into Arabic. Those documents can be read in detail by the interested reader in the book.
Study of documents: necessities, contents, connotations and lessons learned
The book includes an introduction to the documents and their scientific and national importance for study by experts and military specialists.
Since much of the information circulating in the media about the military defeat, the Israeli shock, and the success of the Egyptian strategic deception plan is based on official documents that make the information final facts, and make the narratives documented history for new generations that cannot be denied´-or-denied by Israeli sources, the documents refute the Israeli claim. About the outcome of the war and reveals the dimensions of the complete defeat on the battlefield in front of the Egyptian army.
The importance of studying these documents is due to the following:
1- Contributing to documenting the facts of the Egyptian victory through enemy documents, the most important of which were hidden for 40 years.
2- Providing information coming from the other side about the course of the military battles, the American intervention, and the intelligence battle that preceded the outbreak of the fighting.
3- Enabling the new Egyptian and Arab generations to grasp the conclusive evidence that the October War began and ended as an Egyptian-Arab victory over Israel in the arena of bilateral confrontation.
4- Providing evidence that the breach operation was carried out through American intervention with modern electronic equipment, advanced tanks, warplanes, a command group, and a huge number of pilots, tank crews, and operators of complex equipment that the Israeli army knew nothing about and could not use..
5- Providing documentary evidence that the Egyptian army was able to close in on the Israeli forces in the breach and that Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, met with President Sadat to warn him that if the order was issued to liquidate the breach, the American army would intervene fully to prevent the annihilation of the Israeli forces..
6- Providing documentary evidence that the senior political and military leadership in Israel, including Prime Minister Golda Meir, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, and intelligence leaders, expressed their concern about the idea of Sharon crossing with his tanks to the eastern bank of the canal, and they rejected the idea when it was proposed on October 8 for two reasons. The first is that it does not A change in the balance of the battle, something that Sharon himself recognized, but he believed that the operation could preoccupy the Egyptian forces so that they would not continue their advance in Sinai. The second reason was that he expected Sharon’s operation to cross the canal to end in disaster, as the Egyptians could encircle his forces and eliminate them. Allowing Sharon was not allowed to carry out the operation until after the full American supply arrived on the Egyptian front with equipment, a leadership group, and men, starting on October 12, 1973..
7- The final goal is to provide writers, researchers, and speakers like Al-Istanad with the necessary documentary material to respond to the Israeli myth about the outcome of the war. In addition, translating these documents will help military and political researchers uncover the reasons for the contradiction in the narratives presented by Israeli leaders in their conflicting memoirs about the course of the war and about each of them’s responsibility for the defeat. The content of these documents, especially with regard to the ----dir----ect American role in the war, reveals the falsity of these documents. Israeli attempts to impersonate victory, when we find out from the texts of the documents that the path of the Egyptian forces into Israel would have been open had it not been for the intervention of the United States with equipment, men, and advanced weapons at the time.
8- Definition of documents
The process of releasing government and army documents in Israel began on the thirty-fifth anniversary of the war, and reached its peak in 2013 with 118 official documents divided into:
A - Documents of the Prime Minister and senior leaders, including 8 minutes of the management of the war between October 6-9, 1973.
Its size ranges from 3 to 18 pages, published by the State Archives and reported by Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper.
B- Testimonies of senior military leaders and politicians before the Ijranat Committee, which was formed after the war to investigate the causes of the defeat, are between 20 and 180 pages in length.




Example Of Released Israeli Documents
The chapter also presented several indicators that help the reader identify the content, meanings, and lessons learned from these documents, which are as follows:
1- The nature of the material and the language: The translation team was keen to commit to the accurate transfer into the Arabic language without any interference to -Update-the context to put the reader in the way of thinking and expression of modern people in order to experience the atmosphere of reality recorded in the documents.
2- Lack of clarity of letters:In some documents, it may be due to the use of an old typewriter, which led to some letters being blurred over time,´-or-the publisher’s keenness to make them unclear during photocopying to make reading difficult because he was forced to make the information available under the publishing law.
3-Cognitively integrating documents:Because every official talks about the same events that the committee raises from his position and vision.
4- An eavesdropping station on Egypt’s leaders:The importance of studying documents appears through the intermittent references in the testimonies of some, where a word´-or-name is deleted and written as deleted by the Israeli military censor, then the committee repeats the question to another official, and so on.
5- Pampering names:The reader notes the names of some leaders, such as Eric, Ariel Sharon, and so on.
6- Indicators of the degree of success of the strategic deception plan:Most of the ministers left on the evening of October 5 for Mazra im to spend the Yom Kippur holiday after being reassured and ruling out the possibility of an attack.
7- The genius of the strategic deception plan:It was represented by the success of Egyptian intelligence in implanting a reassuring state of mind for the Israeli leadership by implanting the concept that Egypt would not take the decision to go to war, President Al-Sat’s fear of defeat, interpreting the growing Egyptian crowds as a fall maneuver, and underestimating the significance of explaining the hasty departure of the families of the Russian experts.
8- Study of the abortive strike on Syria:The military researcher will note both the Chief of Staff’s proposal to launch a pre-emptive strike against Syrian aircraft in the afternoon, and the decision was postponed, and the announcement of general mobilization and the call-up of Israeli reserve forces on the course of operations. Were we affected´-or-not?
9-The road is open to Israel in front of our forcesThe reader will notice a sense of shock in the reports the Israeli military leaders presented in the minutes of the leadership meetings about the results of the Egyptian-Syrian attack.
10- Full American intervention in the battle: It was ----dir----ect in changing the course of the battle and enabling Operation Breach through records of requests for urgent American supplies of weapons and men.
11- Dialogues and information contained in the testimoniesIt consisted of two main axes. The first was what information you had on September 13, 1973, when we shot down the Syrian planes. The second was the Israeli army’s preparedness from that time until October 6, 1973 in general.
12- Focus on deletion sites and possible additions:It is necessary to study the sites where additions to the text of documents are likely to occur before publishing them in the original Hebrew and conclude that the intention is to insinuate things that are not true.
13- Studying the contradictory statements about the unknown Egyptian source in the texts of the documents:It must be studied as it may be deceived with the aim of casting doubt on the national role played by Ashraf Marwan, for example.
14- Contradictions in leaders’ statements about responsibility:Each party attempts to deny responsibility and place it on others. Therefore, the Israeli ability to self-criticize and correct mistakes must be taken into consideration.
15- Pay attention to the committee’s bias toward political leaders:It is necessary to try to absolve it of responsibility for the defeat and simply blame it on the military leaders.

Chapters three to nine included the testimonies of some Israeli political leaders after their defeat in the October War, who appeared before the Agranat Committee, which the book does not address in its chapters by introducing them. Therefore, the researcher will quickly present that committee as follows:


The Agranat Committee in its first meeting, from left to right:
Yigal Yadin, Moshe Landau, Shimon Agranat, Yitzhak Nebenzal and Chaim Laskov

The Agranat Committee in its first meeting, from left to right:
Yigal Yadin, Moshe Landau, Shimon Agranat, Yitzhak Nebenzal and Chaim Laskov



Agranat Committee
A National Commission of Inquiry, formed to investigate failures in the Israeli armed forces at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War, concluded that Israel was ill-equipped for the Egyptian attack on the Barlev Line and the simultaneous Syrian attack on the Golan - the first phase of the war in which 2,182 Israeli soldiers were killed.
Two months after the October 1973 War, Israel formed a fact-finding committee headed by the Chief Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, Shimon Agranat. This committee issued its 1,500-page report, of which only 40 pages were published. In January 2005, the Israeli Knesset approved a law prohibiting the publication of that report, despite the fact that 30 years had passed since its publication in 2005.
1975 AD.

Shimon Agranat, Chairman of the Committee
After Israel s defeat in the Yom Kippur War, Golda, Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan and Meir refused to take responsibility for Israel s lack of preparedness. The Minister of Justice, Yacoub S. Shapiro resigned after failing to convince Dayan to take responsibility and resign. These events precipitated the formation of the Agranat Committee. Israeli law allows the Council of Ministers to appoint a fact-finding committee that has the legal power to carry out investigations, and so Golda Meir decided, after much hesitation, to go that route..
It was on a CRanat selection of members of the fact-finding committee in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers, A. did not evadeCHe was free of responsibility, just as the Council of Ministers did. He could have appointed any head of the committee and avoided problems. Due to the seriousness of the situation, he decided toCRanat takes responsibility and is the head of the committee.
And He formed the committee from members, including Moshe Landau, to be his replacement in the event of his illness. He has been his colleague and trusted since they worked together at the Haifa Court. In addition to Landau, Yitzhak Nebenza l was chosen as the country s comptroller general. None of the three had actual military experience, so two generals, Igal Yadin and Haim Lasko, were added.V, AThe committee issued three reports, each report in two parts, one of which is long, detailed and of the highest degree of confidentiality, and the other is short and available to everyone.
The committee began with this question in an analysis of the issue of personal responsibility: What is the appropriate standard of review? Should the committee have taken into account the fact that Dayan himself is a military expert and war hero who has been admired by Israelis since the establishment of the state?´-or-should Diane s own specifications have been ignored and the normal Secretary of Defense standard applied? The Commission applied to Diane the standard of normal conduct. In the eyes of critics, this was a legal jab, a twist and a play on words to exonerate Dayan. The people failed to understand how the committee ignored Dayan s military experience, which made him Minister of Defense in 1977 1967.


Testimonies before the Procedures Committee

Initial Report
The committee made its first recommendations on April 1, 1974MWhich caused a huge noise that shocked the nationa statement The government and T Show Adrag Annat and his committee criticize the cruel people. shift a CRanat and the committee that bears his name went from a high status as saviors of the nation to a group of deviants who did an unacceptable favor..
The committee took into account two types of responsibility: the responsibility of the government and the responsibility of the military leadership. In view of the government, the committee identified the question of responsibility: Do Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan bear parliamentary responsibility for their failure to anticipate the attack? The committee considered that this was outside its judicial authority and that this question fell within the jurisdiction of political institutions (the Knesset, political parties and the Council of Ministers). Therefore, the committee refused to assign responsibility to the state’s leadership and left it to the people and their representatives to be the judges.
But the committee did not refuse to review all matters related to the responsibility of the political leadership. She took on the task of determining whether either Prime Minister Meir´-or-Defense Minister Dayan were personally responsible for Israel s failure to anticipate the attack. The legal question is whether either Meir´-or-Dayan were negligent in performing their pre-war official duties. The committee concluded that none of them were negligent. Because the committee set aside the ruling on parliamentary responsibility and did not find personal responsibility, the result was that neither Golda Meir nor Moshe Dayan were responsible. On the contrary, the military leadership was not so lucky. Because military officers are essentially government employees. Unlike the elected Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan, the committee had no problem judging their actions. The ruling was clear and categorical, as it recommended the dismissal of the Chief of Staff, two generals of divisions, and a number of junior officers. The committee noted that the military leadership had all the necessary information to anticipate the attack, but the generals failed to read what was clear due to the prevailing concept that assumed that Egypt would not enter the war as long as the Egyptian air force was less than the Israeli air force, and that the Arab countries would not enter the war without Egypt. Expanding the Israeli borders will give the regular army the opportunity to repel any attack efficiently until the reserve forces arrive.
Also, belief in the ability of Israeli intelligence to warn the Chief of Staff in sufficient time. The October War invalidated all these assumptions, because they allowed themselves to be prisoners of the concept and so these generals had to leave. Compared to the ruling on the military, the ruling on the government was lenient. The people and observers had trouble understanding how the Council of Ministers got away with this terrible disaster and left the blame solely on the military leadership. The people were angered by the feeling that the result was unfair and the sense of double standards.



Golda Meir And Moshe Dayan After Their Defeat


THE FINAL REPORT

The final part of the report was published on January 30, 1975MAfter its completion, the report contained 1,500 pages, 746 pages devoted to the fighting on the southern front and 311 to the northern front. 42 pages were published to the public, and the remaining pages were kept secret In addition to the IDF’s failures, the report addressed civilian and political control over the army and found that “there were no clear definitions
This criticism revealed a deep feeling of betrayal at the top ranks of the military leadership after the commission s first report was issued. Officers who had been looking forward to Dayan standing by them - after the commission s report was released - were shocked to learn that Dayan was developing a separate legal defense to portray him as an innocent civilian who had been misled by his team of military experts. While the officers were in the process of following the "code of honour" and telling the commission the truth, the cunning Dayan was hiring brilliant consultants to distort the evidence and escape responsibility. They believed that Dayan was trying to influence the committee, just as he had succeeded in influencing the army over the past years. They were convinced that Generals Yadin and Laskov, members of the committee, had the credit for this.

Researcher s opinion:
The book "The October Victory in Israeli Documents", the first part, focuses on the Israeli side and provides a unique and valuable view of the events and vision of the Israeli leadership during that war. We point out to them the positives of the book as follows:
1- The book presented original documents and sources from the Israeli side, which means that it provides a ----dir----ect and reliable view of the events and decisions taken by the Israeli leadership during the Yom Kippur War. These documents are a valuable source for understanding detailed political and military analyzes of the war.
2- Presenting the Israeli leadership’s point of view and perceptions of events. This point of view could provide an Israeli perspective and a deeper understanding of the challenges and Israeli strategic thinking during the war.
3- The book provided detailed information about the ongoing military developments, the tactical and strategic decisions made by Israel, and how it dealt with the increasing challenges it faced in the face of a surprise Egyptian and Syrian attack.
4- Because the book is based on original documents and reliable sources, it enhances transparency and credibility in presenting information. This can be an important resource for researchers and those interested in studying the Arab-Israeli conflict and the modern history of the region.
5- The book provided an opportunity to analyze the mistakes and successes that occurred on the Israeli side during the war, so valuable lessons can be learned from these analyzes and applied in other contexts.
6- Of course, presenting multiple points of view and balance in the novel is also important for understanding the conflict comprehensively and comprehensively. This book may provide a specific Israeli perspective, so it may also be necessary to look at other perspectives and accounts to get a full picture of events.
Despite the historical and informational value that the book “October Victory in Israeli Documents” can provide, it may have some drawbacks. The book will present some of them.:
1- The book focused mainly on the point of view of the Israeli leadership and Israeli documents related to the Yom Kippur War. This clear bias could affect the balance and comprehensiveness in the analysis and presentation of the novel. Therefore, it was necessary for readers to be informed of other points of view to ensure a balanced and comprehensive analysis of the events..
2- The book was based mainly on Israeli documents and the Israeli leadership, and did not rely heavily on Arab sources and documents, which may lead to a lack of Arab vision and understanding of the events and Arab analyzes of the war..
3- The book is criticized for its focus on the Israeli side, which makes it unbalanced. It was necessary to provide a balance in the sources and references used to present a balanced picture of the events.
4- The book may be considered merely a collection of documents and sources without in-depth analysis´-or-a strong interpretive framework, as readers may often need other sources to provide a deeper analysis of the events and balance between the documents presented.
5- There may be a lack of complete and comprehensive documentation of events, the book may contain specific selections of documents and sources, and therefore may lack comprehensive coverage of all aspects and details relating to the war.
6- It is important for the reader to exercise caution and constructive criticism when using the book and evaluating the information provided. It may be necessary to consult other sources to get a complete and comprehensive picture of the events and analysis related to the Yom Kippur War.
7- The book did not display any pictures of those documented documents in the Hebrew language for readers to see, nor did it care to show any pictures during those sessions´-or-investigations, as they may be much more informative than just a literal translation of the documents, as a picture is worth a thousand words. The pictures and documents contained in the research article were not It is contained in the book but compiled by the researcher from several different sources.
8- The book was just put at the endBibliographIt was easy for the reader to follow the figures discussed in the investigations and sessions from pages 699 to page 723, and they were placed in the margins of the chapter so that it is easy to identify the most important figures who were present in the sessions.

In conclusionThe reader must have the ability to distinguish between the facts, analyzes and opinions presented in the book. It is also necessary to consider other points of view and narratives to obtain a comprehensive and balanced view of the events and analyzes related to the October War. It may provide in-depth analysis of Israeli documents and explain the decisions and events that occurred during the war and An assessment of Israel s tactical and strategic successes and mistakes in that war. In the end recommend Refer to the original source of the book and explore available reviews and assessments by experts, historians and critics.

Submitted By The Researcher
Dr. Ghada Mahmoud Mohamed Abdel Hamid
Fellow of the National Defense College –
Military Academy for postgraduate and strategic studies.
PhD. Holder ,in Sociology of Mass Media and Communication - Faculty of Arts - Alexandria University
The Egyptian Arabic Republic
[email protected]
















Sources used

1) Ibrahim Al-Bahrawi, and others, “The October Victory in Israeli Documents,” Political Leadership Documents - Part One, Cairo: National Center for Translation, 2014 AD.
2) Magazine website The Times of Israel Viewed on October 23, 2023, capacity 1900, available at the following link
0https://www.timesofisrael.com/
3) Youm7 website Viewed on October 23, 2023, capacity 1930, available at the link
ttps://www.youm7.com/story/2023/9/12/Israeli-documents-reveal-new-secrets-about-the-October-War-Dayan-confesses/6302112
4) Russia Today channel website RT Arabic Viewed on October 27, 2023, capacity 1830, available at the link
https://arabic.rt.com/middle_east/1493313-

5) location Sunrise Gate Viewed on October 29, 2023, capacity 1730, available at the link
https://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=06102014&id=3d3ab323-6c9f-405a-8249-cc64745d8844
6) Maarifa website, Agranat Committee,Viewed on October 27, 2023, capacity 1930, available at the link
https://www.marefa.org/%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9_%D8%A3%DA%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7 %D8%AA

7) Israeli Knesset website Viewed on October 30, 2023, capacity 1830, available at the link
Agranat Commission lexicon entry Knesset.org.il

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